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5. Post-demobilisation groups and forced 
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 a quantitative approach
Gabriel Rojas Andrade1
This chapter seeks to carry out a quantitative and geographic review of the presence of post-demobilisation groups (PDGs)2 in Colombia and their impact on forced displacement in the country up to December 
2013. 
Its purpose is to offer an overview of forced displacement in Colombia, 
showing the impact of new actors who reproduce and adapt tactics of social 
and territorial control towards capturing legal and illegal income. These groups 
also demand particular attention in the framework of negotiations towards the 
end of the conflict between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia−Ejército del Pueblo − FARC−EP) insurgency. This attention should 
focus on the potential of former combatants being again drawn into criminal 
activities that cause violence and exert pressure on rural and urban populations, 
and participating in the growing consolidation of criminal networks with local 
and national impact that may affect the stability and sustainability of a possible 
agreement in Havana.
The data presented in this chapter comes from four complementary sources:
1. Fieldwork carried out in six municipalities in Colombia traditionally 
affected by armed conflict (Bogotá, Soacha, Cúcuta, Quibdó, 
Buenaventura and Tumaco). Semi-structured interviews and focal groups 
were carried out with representatives of local and national institutions, 
officials from international organisations, members of civil society and 
leaders of grassroots and victims’ organisations.
1 Graphs and maps, unless otherwise noted, were prepared by Paola Hurtado from the 
Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES) and the 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
2 For the purposes of this chapter, PDGs are macro-criminal structures derived from 
paramilitary groups which demobilised in 2005 and took up arms again later, those that 
never demobilised, and those that appeared after the demobilisation process of the so-
called Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). They include former members of these 
paramilitary groups.
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2. Monitoring by the Human Rights and Displacement consultancy 
(Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento − 
CODHES) on the humanitarian situation in the country. Its estimates 
of the number of displaced people are obtained through a methodology 
that contrasts different sources of information’. The main official and 
unofficial sources used in this methodology are:
3. (a) Official sources: Public Ministry (Ministerio Público), including 
the Office of the Ombudsman (Personerías Municipales and 
Defensoría del Pueblo) and the Integrated Assistance and Reparation 
to Victims Unit (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las 
Víctimas).
(b) Unofficial sources: this includes the monitoring of national and 
regional news sources; ethnic organisations; grassroots groups; the 
Catholic Church (through the Secretariado Nacional de Pastoral 
Social); United Nations (UN) agencies, local and national non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations.
Information from these sources provides the basis for contrasting the 
data. The displacement figures for each municipality are calculated 
according to their scope and the dates of multiple and mass events. 
Department and national-level figures are derived by aggregating 
municipal and departmental data. The main restrictions identified 
when using the ‘contrast’ methodology are that: a) although it tries to 
avoid duplication, there is still a high risk of under-reporting despite the 
resulting figures being higher than in other information systems; b) the 
available information does not cover all areas of the country; c) the data 
refers to the displaced population only according to the municipality 
to which they arrived, and it is only possible to identify the respective 
municipalities of origin in multiple, mass and intra-urban displacement 
events.
4. Maps showing the territorial presence of armed actors. The paramilitary 
presence in the maps shown in this chapter is a categorical variable. In 
other words, it indicates only whether or not there is a presence, with 
different groups indicated by the depth of shading on the map. The 
elaboration of the maps draws on reports from the Early Warning System 
(Sistema de Alertas Tempranas) of the Office of the Ombudsman, 
INDEPAZ NGO compilations, news reports and army announcements. 
Maps identify the presumed armed actors behind acts of armed conflict 
and similar events, which allows the existence of a particular group to be 
evidenced in a specific municipality.
Since data are disaggregated at a municipal level, the same group can 
be present in several different locations in the same department. These 
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data are indicative of the (visible) presence of armed groups, particularly 
paramilitary and post-demobilisation groups, but do not allow the size of 
the group membership to be identified.
5. Literature review of project reports from government agencies, press 
items and reports by international civil society organisations.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first gives a general 
description of the PDGs’ modus operandi and the strategies through which 
they cause forced internal displacement. It continues by demonstrating the 
historical presence of paramilitary and PDG groups through two contrasting 
maps of such presence. Finally, brief consideration is given to the reintegration 
of former combatants into civilian life through transitional strategies within 
peace process framework between the Colombian government and the FARC.
Displacement in Colombia
According to data from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)’s Global Overview 2015, 
People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence, Colombia has the second-
highest levels of internal displacement associated with conflict and violence in 
the world. Its 6 million victims are surpassed only by Syria’s 7.6 million.3
Similarly, CODHES estimates for 2013 indicate that in Colombia at least 
203,976 people were forced to flee their homes due to armed conflict. Out of 
this total, 28,032 were displaced in massive4 or multiple5 events, which were 
comprised of 130 cases and 7,205 families.
3 NRC and IMDC Global Overview 2015, People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence 
(2015), p. 8, available at http://bit.ly/1ldAq3n (accessed 15 March 2016). 
4 Mass displacements are events that affect 50 or more individuals or 10 or more families.
5 Multiple displacements are events that affect between 15 and 49 individuals or between 3 
and 9 families.
Graph 5.1. Countries with the largest displacement related to conflict and violence 
Source: IDMC 2015
Syria 7.6million
Colombia 6.0 million
South Sudan 1.4 million
Pakistan 1.9 million
DR Congo 2.7 million
Sudan 3.1 million
Iraq 3.2 million
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Graph 5.2. Forced displacement in Colombia: 1985−2014
Source: CODHES − SISDHES 2014
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This means that, according to CODHES, at least 5,905,996 individuals in 
Colombia were forcibly displaced between 1985 and 2013.6 It indicates that, 
on average, 203,665 individuals were displaced per year in the last 29 years. 
Out of this total, the departments with the highest numbers of people affected 
by mass displacements in 2013 were Antioquia (3,774), Cauca (8,223), Chocó 
(2,496), Córdoba (1,053), Nariño (5,168) and Valle del Cauca (4,589). These 
departments also have the highest post-demobilisation group presence levels of 
the last five years.
In the context of a peace process between the government and the FARC, it is 
important to ask whether the humanitarian crisis due to internal displacement 
is being caused exclusively by the insurgent group or whether other armed 
actors have an impact on the continuous growth in the number of displaced 
persons during the last decade. As maps 1 and 2 indicate, challenges to a possible 
post-conflict scenario in Colombia are not limited to the consequences of a 
cessation of armed hostilities between the security forces and FARC members. 
Rather, it is also necessary to consider the presence and coercive power of other 
actors7 that operate in the country and which are responsible for victimising 
the civilian population.
6 According to official data from the Colombian government, 6,414,700 individuals had been 
historically displaced by 1 Sept. 2015, out of which 25,922 had to flee that same year. See 
Red Nacional de Información (RNI) (2015), Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral 
a las Víctimas (UARIV) (May), available at http://bit.ly/1nPzF34 (accessed 15 March 2016).
7 The actor concept refers to an armed structure that, in the context of the conflict, has the 
capability to undertake recurring violent actions in a particular space and for a significant 
Graph 5.3. People displaced by multiple and mass events in Colombia, 2012−14
Source: CODHES – SISDHES 2014
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Graph 5.5. Actors allegedly responsible for mass and multiple displacements in Colombia, 
2012−14
Source: CODHES – SISHES 2014
Graph 5.4. People affected by multiple and mass displacements, organised by department, 
2012−14
Source: CODHES – SISDHES 2014
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Multiple and mass displacement events are merely indicators of the degree of 
victimisation caused by PDGs compared with other armed actors in Colombia. 
Although the FARC’s actions, and clashes between it and the security forces, 
still generate displacement of people whose lands are deliberately appropriated 
or who find themselves in the crossfire, mass displacement events in 2012 and 
2013 are mostly associated with the actions of PDGs, particularly those events 
characterised as intra-urban forced displacement.
During 2012, the main armed actors in urban environments were PDGs. 
Twenty-four events of intra-urban displacement were identified by CODHES, 
out of which 23 were mass displacements. They were concentrated in six 
municipalities: Medellín, Buenaventura, Tumaco, Soacha, El Tarra and Toribío. 
In 22 of the 24 events the actors responsible formed part of the network of 
PDGs, including – among others − La Empresa, Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, 
Los Combos en Medellín, La Oficina, as well as other unidentified groups. The 
FARC and the security forces were the perpetrators in the remaining events. 
The increase in intra-urban forced displacement in 2012 and 2013 in the areas 
length of time. For the purposes of this chapter actors are understood to cover the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo (FARC−EP); the Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (ELN); State agents including the national army, police, navy and air 
force (grouped together as ‘security forces’); paramilitary groups such as the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá 
(ACCU) and post-demobilisation groups like the Urabeños o Clan Usúga, the Águilas 
Negras, Los Rastrojos, La Empresa, la Oficina and the combos from Medellín and other 
unidentified actors.
Graph 5.6. Intra-urban forced displacement, historic patterns
 Source: CODHES – 2013
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Map 5.1. Mass displacement events in Colombia, January−November 2014. Map 
created by Ingrid Paola Hurtado
Source: CODHES-SISDHES 2014
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Map 5.2. Multiple displacement events in Colombia, organised by department, January−
November 2014. Map created by Ingrid Paola Hurtado
Source: CODHES-SISDHES 2014
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with PDG presence indicates that the peace process with the FARC does not 
entail the end of rural or urban violence in Colombia. On the contrary, one 
of the main challenges faced by the State is the increase in criminal actions by 
groups derived from the paramilitaries that now occupy the power vacuum left 
by the old leaders of the self-defence forces [autodefensas] and drug traffickers, 
and their role in prolonging the humanitarian crisis caused by armed conflict 
in Colombia.
If forced displacement in Colombia has not decreased after the AUC’s 
demobilisation, but rather the perpetrators, patterns and flows have simply 
become more varied, then serious concerns arise regarding the future of 
FARC combatants who lay down their weapons and seek to reintegrate into 
civilian life. The next section provides a general description of the PDGs’ 
modus operandi, their relationship with the demobilisation of paramilitary 
groups, and the social and territorial control that continues to generate 
forced displacement. The purpose is to suggest a number of possible scenarios 
concerning the presence of the armed groups in light of the possible peace deal 
with the FARC and the challenges it would bring to the rural and urban areas 
to which their armed actions would be redirected.
Former combatants, post-demobilisation groups and 
practices of recruitment and territorial control
Since 2006, PDGs have organised themselves around the paramilitary 
structures and leaders that remained after the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia demobilised, at the same time as they have co-opted elements 
from guerrilla and drug-trafficking groups. As such, the spaces for territorial 
control and drug-trafficking corridors, as well as the coercive practices inflicted 
on the civilian population in pursuit of legal and illegal sources of income, 
have also adapted to the power vacuum left by the demobilisation of the old 
paramilitary leaders. In consequence, criminal networks – without a clear 
vertical hierarchical structure, but based on a franchise model that allows 
subcontracting to relatively independent local nodes – now exercise social and 
territorial control through billing offices, combos and gangs. Similarly, these 
networks also maintain links with transnational trafficking networks located in 
Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina and Spain.8
The process of readjustment among PDGs in order to consolidate their 
presence in strategic areas also takes advantage of the new urban dynamics of 
armed conflict in the country. In addition to processing and transporting coca 
8 J. McDermott, ‘La victoria de los Urabeños. La nueva cara del crimen organizado en 
Colombia’, InSight Crime, May 2014, available at http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-del-dia/
guerreros-unidos-nueva-cara-crimen-organizado-mexico, pp. 10−15 (accessed 15 March 
2016). 
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paste, and selling cocaine, PDGs have found both commercial and traditional 
mining an important source of income through their control of mining areas 
and extortion of small- and large-scale miners in rural areas. Nonetheless, 
urban spaces have also come to represent a means not only of subsistence but 
also of consolidating social, territorial and economic power.
The diversity of PDGs was originally due to the struggles between 
different remnants of the paramilitary groups that sought to take over the 
drug-trafficking business and gain control of income from local-level drug-
trafficking, extortion, theft and plundering in the cities. As two of the most 
influential groups, the Rastrojos and the Urabeños, transformed into more 
effective and active networks, these were complemented by a wide array of 
other illicit sources of income. Thus, influence over drug-trafficking and 
mining became accompanied by their involvement in smuggling, the arms 
trade, extortion, human trafficking and prostitution. 
These practices could not be sustained without an active presence in both 
the cities and the rural areas. For that reason, the exponential growth of PDGs 
was not limited to rural areas traditionally linked to the armed conflict, but 
also established itself by means of extreme violence in populations in the Pacific 
regions (59 events of mass displacement in 2013) and the Caribbean (49 events 
of mass displacement in 2013), in border areas. They also expanded to large 
cities, where the activities of extortion networks, combos and gangs that work 
as contractors for PDG groups have great impact, despite being camouflaged in 
local neighbourhoods, which makes detecting their presence difficult.9
Despite frequent successes by the security forces against suspected PDG 
members (between 2009 and 2012, some 4,536 PDG members were 
‘neutralised’ and 4,493 were captured, according to figures from the Ministry 
of Defence),10 so-called criminal bands [bandas criminales] continue to expand 
throughout the territory of Colombia. 
If the Ministry of Defence data are reliable (and those ‘captured are not 
also those “neutralised”’), at least 9,029 individuals were members of PDGs 
between 2009−12. This number would exceed the number of FARC combatants 
calculated by the same source − that is, 7,20011 – and would make PDGs the 
most numerous armed actor in the country. The figures also suggest that PDG 
members represent about one third of the total number of individuals who 
9 For a detailed analysis of the composition and contribution of roles in PDGs see 
McDermott, ‘La victoria de los Urabeños’, pp. 7−11. McDermott uses the term ‘criminal 
band’ [banda criminal], employed by the Colombian government to describe what this 
chapter has referred to as ‘post-demobilisation groups’ (PDGs). 
10 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Avance en la Política de Seguridad Nacional (March 2014), 
available at http://bit.ly/1gpAD6g (accessed 15 March 2016). 
11 El Colombiano, ‘Las Farc solo tienen 7.200 guerrilleros: Mindefensa’ (Sept. 2013), available 
at http://bit.ly/1sPX8mM (accessed 15 March 2016). 
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Graph 5.7. Neutralised PDG members
Source: Ministerio de Defensa. Observatorio del delito de la DIJIN Policía Nacional, 
2014
Graph 5.8. Captured PDG members
Source: Ministerio de Defensa. Observatorio del delito de la DIJIN Policía Nacional, 
2014
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demobilised during the demobilisation process with the autodefensas between 
2005 and 2006, that is, 29,079 individuals (see graph 1). In other words, from 
a merely quantitative standpoint, PDG membership could be made up of at 
least a third of demobilised AUC members.
Table 5.1. Demobilisation of AUC members
Demobilisation # of 
people 
Date of 
demobilisation
ZUT – Temporary Location Area 
Bloque 
Resistencia 
Tairona (SNSM 
- Magdalena)
1,166 3 February 
2006
Vereda Quebrada del Sol in the corregimiento 
de Guachaca, municipio Santa Marta, 
departamento Magdalena.
Bloque Norte 2,300 8 and 10 
March 2006
Corregimiento Chimila, municipio de El 
Copey, departamento del Cesar.
Bloque Montes 
de María
594 14 July 2005 Predio ‘Pepe’ in corregimiento San Pablo, 
municipio María la Baja, departamento de 
Bolívar. 
Autodefensas of 
the sur of the 
Magdalena
47 4 December 
2004
Corregimiento Santa Rosa, municipio de 
Santa Ana, departamento Magdalena.
Bloque 
Catatumbo
1,437 10 December 
2004
‘Brisas of the Sardinata’ farm, in the 
corregimiento Campo Dos, municipio de 
Tibú, departamento de Norte de Santander.
Frente Julio 
Cesar Peinado 
Becerra
251 4 March 2006 Corregimiento Torcoroma, municipio de San 
Martín, departamento Cesar.
Bloque Cintral 
Bolívar
2,523 31 January 
2006
‘La Granja’ in el corregimiento Buena 
Vista, municipio de Santa Rosa del Sur, 
departamento de Bolívar.
Frente Mojana 
de las AUC
110 2 February 
2005
Recreational area of the corregimiento 
Nueva Esperanza, municipio Guaranda, 
departamento de Sucre
Frentes 
Nordeste 
Antioqueño 
(Remedios 
Antioquia)
1,922 30 January 
2005
Vereda San Cristóbal of the corregimiento 
Santa Isabel, municipio de Remedios, 
departamento de Antioquia.
Bloque 
Córdoba
925 18 January 
2005
Corregimiento Santa Fe Ralito, municipio de 
Tierra Alta, departamento de Córdoba. 
Anillos de 
Seguridad 
(Santa Fe de 
Ralito)
300 27 August 2005 Corregimiento Santa Fe Ralito, municipio de 
Tierra Alta, departamento de Córdoba.
Frente Héroes 
de Tolova
465 15 June 2005 Vereda Rusia Ocho of the corregimiento 
Mata Maíz, municipio de Valincia, 
departamento de Córdoba
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Demobilisation # of 
people 
Date of 
demobilisation
ZUT – Temporary Location Area 
Bloque 
Bananero
453 25 November 
2004
Finca La Macrena in corregimiento El Dos, 
in the municipio de Turbo, departamento de 
Antioquia.
Bloque 
Noroccidente 
Antioqueño
222 11 September 
2005
School and neighbouring plot in the 
vereda ‘El Rodeo’, municipio de Sopetrán, 
departamento de Antioquia.
Bloque 
Sur oeste 
Antioqueño de 
las AUC
125 30 January 
2005
Institución Educativa ‘Juan TaMay’ of the 
corregimiento Alfonso López, municipio 
Ciudad Bolívar, departamento de Antioquia.
Bloque Suroeste 
Antioqueño
125 30 January 
2005
Institución Educativa ‘Juan TaMay’ of the 
corregimiento Alfonso López, municipio 
Ciudad Bolívar, departamento de Antioquia. 
Frente Héroes 
de Granada
2,033 1 August 2005 Finca La Mariana, paraje ‘Palo Negro’, 
corregimiento Cristales, municipio de San 
Roque, departamento de Antioquia
Bloque Cacique 
Nutibara 
868 25 November 
2003
Lot ‘La Montaña centr recreacional’ (sede 
PROSOCIAL), municipio de La Ceja, 
departamento de Antioquia 
Autodefensas 
Campesinas de 
Puerto Boyacá
742 28 January 
2006
Vereda El Marfil, municipio de Puerto 
Boyacá, departamento de Boyacá.
Autodefensas 
Unidas de 
Cundinamarca
148 9 December 
2004
Instituto Técnico Agrícola ’Luis Carlos 
Galán’, in the corregimiento Terán, municipio 
de Yacopí, departamento de Cundinamarca. 
Autodefensas 
Campesinas of 
del Magdalena 
Medio
990 7 February 
2006
Corregimiento La Merced, municipio de 
Puerto Triunfo, departamento de Antioquia.
Frente Héroes 
and Mártires de 
Guatica
552 15 December 
2005
Vereda La Esperanza, municipio de Santuario, 
departamento de Risaralda.
Bloque Tolima 207 22 October 
2005
Hacienda ‘Tau Tau’ in la vereda Tajomedio, 
municipio de Ambalema, departamento 
Tolima.
Bloque 
Centauros
1,135 3 September 
2005
‘Corinto’ farm in the corregimiento 
Tilodirán, municipio de Yopal, departamento 
de Casanare.
Bloque Arauca 207 23 December 
2005
Vereda Puerto Gaitán, municipio de Tame, 
departamento de Arauca.
Frente Vichada 325 24 September 
2005
Inspección de Policía El Placer, municipio de 
Cumaribo, departamento de Vichada
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Demobilisation # of 
people 
Date of 
demobilisation
ZUT – Temporary Location Area 
Autodefensas 
Campesinas 
de Meta and 
Vichada
209 6 August 2005 ‘La María’ farm in the vereda San Miguel, 
municipio de Puerto Gaitán, departamento 
Meta. 
Bloque Norte 1,765 11 April 2006 Corregimiento Chimila, municipio El Copey, 
departamento Cesar.
Bloque Pacifico 150 23 August 2005 Vacation and tourist center ‘Estadero 
Kurungano’, municipio Istmina, 
departamento Chocó. 
Bloque Calima 564 18 December 
2004
’El Jardín’ farm in corregimiento Galicia, 
of the municipio de Bugalagrande, 
departamento Valle del Cauca.
Grupo de las 
Autodefensas 
Campesinas de 
Ortega
168 7 December 
2003
Escuela El Edén, municipio de Cajibio, 
departamento Cauca
Bloque 
Libertadores of 
the Sur
667 30 July 2005 ‘El Romance’ lot in el paraje ‘El Tablón’, 
of the Inspección de Policía de El Tablón, 
municipio de Taminango, departamento de 
Nariño. 
Frente Sur 
PutuMay of the 
BCB
504 1 March 2006 Vereda La Esperanza of the corregimiento 
Santa Ana, municipio de Puerto Asís, 
departamento Putumayo
Frentes 
Próceres of the 
Caguán-B CB 
de las AUC
552 15 February 
2006
Vereda Liberia, municipio Valparaíso, 
departamento de Caquetá
Frente 
Costanero of 
the Bloque 
Elmer Cárdinas
309 12 April 2006 Corregimiento Mello Villavicencio, 
municipio de Necoclí, departamento de 
Antioquia.
Frente 
Pavarando 
and Dabeida 
Bloque Elmer 
Cárdinas 
484 30 April 2006 Corregimiento El Cuarenta, municipio 
Turbo, departamento de Antioquia.
Frente Norte 
Medio Salaqui 
Bloque Elmer 
Cárdinas
745 15 August 2006 Urabá Chocoano, municipio de Necocli
Bloque Mineros 2,790 20 January 
2006
Hacienda ‘La Ranchería’ in the vereda 
Pecoralia, municipio de Tarazá, departamento 
de Antioquia
TOTAL 29,079
Source: CODHES 2006
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The most recent Ministry of Defence data on PDGs warrant careful study. 
However, it is important to emphasise at this point that post-demobilisation 
groups are not exclusively made up of people who took up arms again or who 
never demobilised, but also of new recruits. Fieldwork in six municipalities 
(Bogotá, Soacha, Cúcuta, Quibdó, Buenaventura and Tumaco) found that 
most of these new members are children and young people hailing from places 
with structural problems in terms of access to services and the fulfilment of 
fundamental rights.
In these six areas, including the Capital District, gangs, combos and 
extortion networks co-opt children and young people as a means of ensuring 
the operation of the PDG franchise that they represent. Although one of the 
main tasks of such groups is to safeguard the existence of territorial corridors 
used to move drugs, other practices like kidnapping, robbery, extortion, 
selective homicide, microtrafficking and prostitution are commonplace and 
require a regular ‘workforce’ in order to be carried out. Forced or induced 
recruitment is a common practice in places where there is limited enjoyment 
of spare time or where there are no opportunities for forms of employment or 
recreation that are not based on violence. One of the main reasons for intra-
urban displacement detected through fieldwork is that of resisting recruitment 
and the risks that this generates for individuals and their families.
Women and girls are affected in different ways. In many cases, an armed 
group gains access to a neighbourhood or vereda through exerting pressure on 
a woman. The leader of a gang, band or combo who works for a PDG seeks 
to seduce a girl or teenager in order to gain entry into her home and then 
bring in new group members to occupy and taking over houses in strategic 
locations for control of the neighbourhood. Thus, territorial control starts 
through control of the youngest community members and then extends to the 
rest of the community through the use of terror, anxiety and invisible dividing 
lines that prevent the free movement of the population. If this dynamic lasts, 
the neighbourhood’s young people turn into ‘hard men/women’ [los duros]12 
within those armed groups that cause forced displacement. War becomes a 
child’s game in which children kill and are killed, and commit and fall victim to 
crimes that ensure the perpetuation of the criminal networks, with the justice 
system unable to protect or judge them effectively and guarantee their rights.
Forced displacement caused by PDGs in Colombia has thus become a 
consequence of a form of social and territorial control that uses violent practices 
to generate profit for criminal networks, but is also a strategy employed to 
ensure the continued viability of strategic corridors for contraband goods, 
and arms and drug trafficking. This has caused older routes that were already 
12 The duro category in a neighbourhood refers to the leader of a criminal network node which 
exercises violent social and territorial control over a defined area.
79POST-DEMOBILISATION GROUPS IN COLOMBIA
controlled by paramilitary groups to transform in response to new pressures 
from security forces and also to generate new forced displacement flows.
The usual pattern of rural to urban displacement has been replaced by a 
strong movement between exclusively urban spaces which the population seeks 
to use as an individual protection strategy in order to activate the support of 
networks of family members and friends while avoiding a new displacement 
and maintaining their sources of informal income. Nonetheless, this protection 
is usually insufficient and thus persecution, fatiguing of the networks, lack 
of institutional support, clashes between groups or eviction as a strategy to 
consolidate territorial gains all end up causing the renewed flight of these 
individuals and their families. Intra-urban displacement thus turns to inter-
urban displacement or even transnational displacement in border areas. The 
reach of the criminal networks operating in any one of these scenarios results 
in a constant pilgrimage of victims of forced displacement in search of safety. 
The Single Victims’ Registry (Registro Único de Víctimas − RUV) does not 
monitor this movement accurately, as it presently lacks a specific measuring 
mechanism to simultaneously identify the expulsion and reception locations of 
intra-urban displacement victims. The data thus reveal a high level of under-
recording, which is also associated with the lack of complaints by victims, their 
distrust of the authorities and the absence of rigorous strategies for detecting 
cases of intra-urban displacement when these do not take place en masse. 
Moreover, it was not until Constitutional Court decisions in 2013 that it 
became possible to ensure that PDG victims were registered in the RUV. Based 
on Article 3 of the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley 1448, 2011), those 
evaluating the declarations of forced displacement victims originally rejected 
their legal recognition as victims requiring reparation by claiming that PDGs 
did not cause victimisation ‘in the context of the armed conflict’ but rather 
acted as manifestations of common crime. 
It is evident that the criminal networks described above do not just carry out 
random and occasional criminal acts. Rather, their reach and modus operandi 
can generate as much or more coercion than a paramilitary or guerrilla group 
across an extended time in any particular location. In this respect, PDGs are 
situated in a ‘grey area’ of the Colombian armed conflict that is not strictly 
political, but does imply the control of a territorial power that seriously 
affects the fundamental rights of the civilian population. These arguments 
were recognised and endorsed in the Constitutional Court’s 2012 judgments: 
C-253 and C-781 and the 2013 judicial writ [auto] 119, as a result of which 
the Victim’s Unit Evaluation Directorate (Dirección para la Valoración de 
la Unidad de Víctimas) was forced to include those affected by PDGs as 
beneficiaries of integral reparation under the Victims’ Law.
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Finally, it is also important to highlight that the PDGs’ actions cannot be 
exclusively categorised as criminal in the same way as those carried out by 
drug trafficking and criminal groups such as those in Central America and 
Mexico. Their continuity with the paramilitary groups who preceded them 
entails the continuation of anti-insurgent practices and stigmatisation of social, 
trade union and leftist leaders. Moreover, cruel acts still take place in order 
to generate terror, such as the dismemberment, of persons in the port areas 
of Buenaventura and Tumaco and threats, leaflets and murders perpetrated 
against local leaders in Bogotá. Although it is not possible to identify a clear 
political project behind the PDGs’ actions, their paramilitary practices remain 
evident in their business activities, and in their involvement in the intimidation 
to social movements in Colombia have traditionally been subjected. Forced 
displacement is a symptom of this type of coercion.
The next section looks at the geographic changes in Colombia’s PDG 
presence after the demobilisation of paramilitary groups. Its purpose is to 
set out the groups’ territorial evolution and purging as a result of filling the 
ensuing power vacuums and taking control in areas that are strategic to their 
illegal income sources. Given the characteristics of their presence, as described 
in this chapter, it is important to note that the dynamics displayed in these 
maps are based on the coercive practices evidenced thus far in the chapter, 
and thus in the violation of the constitutional rights of those populations over 
which PDGs exercise power.
Presence of paramilitary groups and PDGs in Colombia
This section presents a geographical overview of the historical presence of 
paramilitary groups and PDGs in the Colombian territory. In both cases, the 
‘paramilitary presence’ category is retained to show continuity between the 
two sorts of groups. The two maps suggest that the process of demobilisation 
between 2006 and 2008, followed by the struggle for power and territorial 
control, led to a multiplication in the number of groups present in Colombia. 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the dots on the map represent violent 
actions attributed to PDGs.
From a comparative perspective, what these maps demonstrate is a worrying 
increase in the territorial spread of those criminal networks that are the 
heirs of paramilitary actors, which now span the whole country. This gives 
the impression that as long as PDGs continue to maintain the businesses 
previously run by their paramilitary forebears, and while the social situation 
in those regions does not lead to an increase in citizens’ standard of living, the 
alternative of violent crime will continue to be an option for the inhabitants of 
many regions of the country.
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Post-demobilisation groups consolidate international support through 
developing a profitable business model that involves a number of different 
actors. Guerrilla groups take care of growing and harvesting the drugs. 
Organised criminal groups [oficinas de cobro] are responsible for transporting 
precursors, weapons and coca paste and ensuring the upkeep of laboratories. 
Finally, combos and gangs supply the social and territorial control necessary 
for the transit of merchandise, engage in other criminal activities that generate 
additional profits, and also pressure and co-opt public officials and members 
of the security forces in order to guarantee that their business can continue 
uninterrupted. It is worth noting that, as mentioned above, when members of 
criminal franchises are captured and neutralised, the number of new recruits 
also increases. The worrying territorial expansion evidenced by these maps 
leads one to question whether the strategy of pursuing the sources of group 
leader financing can eventually end with the control a new boss acquires once 
the previous one has been captured and the ensuing power vacuum. The PDGs’ 
capacity to adapt is their main advantage, as the territorial evolution evident in 
the following maps demonstrates.
Final thoughts: reintegration as an indispensable 
component of a transition towards peace
The proliferation of PDGs evidenced in the previous section requires that the 
State seek effective solutions that take account of the pressure that a scenario of 
demobilisation by FARC members could exert on urban and rural populations. 
In this context, the institutional support given to former combatants is 
as important as a response to criminal networks and the challenging social 
situation in regions where PDGs exercise control. This section aims to offer 
some suggestions on reintegrating former combatants that may be relevant to 
the institutional response after an eventual agreement between armed actors in 
Colombia.
If reintegration into civilian life is not carried out in a dignified manner, 
then former combatants will have few viable alternatives for continuing with 
their lives outside the armed group. Likewise, an individual with experience in 
using violent means becomes an attractive target for recruitment by criminal 
networks that value the ability of former combatants to carry out criminal 
activities. This suggests that, in addition to the forced recruitment of children 
and young people, recidivism by former combatants is one of the main factors 
behind PDGs’ permanence, growing strength and expansion.
According to the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (Agencia Colombiana 
para la Reintegración − ACR) which is in charge of returning former combatants 
from the illegal armed groups to civilian society, out of 56,171 demobilised 
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Map 5.3. Paramilitary presence in 2002
Source: CODHES 2014
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Map 5.4. Paramilitary presence in 2014
Source: CODHES 2015
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individuals in the country, 46,806 have started a reintegration process that 
includes psychosocial advice, orientation on education issues and vocational 
training components. Nonetheless, the figures show that 12,186 individuals 
abandoned the programme due to absence for a period of over six months, 
losing their benefits, or voluntary withdrawal. If this number is added to the 
24,434 individuals who did not even start the reintegration process, this could 
suggest that some 36,620 individuals are not participating in any kind of State 
reintegration process following their demobilisation.
Table 5.2. Total number of targeted population and non-targeted population in the 
programmes carried out by the Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, 2013
Targeted population
Active 23,041
Monetary benefits suspended 289
Inactive 4,035
Finished components 1,051
Completed 3,321
Total 31,737
Non-targeted population
Absent for six or more months 10,302
Deceased 2,973
Lost benefits 1,985
Withdrew voluntarily 49
Total 15,159
Source: ACR. Datos SIR, up to 31 December 2013
Even if this figure is compared only with the total number of AUC 
members who demobilised between 2004 and 2006, as shown in the previous 
section, the intended beneficiary population of the government’s reintegration 
programme is not even large enough to cover the former combatants from that 
demobilisation process.
In a possible post-conflict scenario with the FARC guerrilla, it is worrying 
that the continued existence of a prosperous business such as drug trafficking 
or mining may be more appealing to a former foot soldier than a life of struggle 
with no sustainable employment and the potential for rejection by society.
Although it is true that the six million victims of the Colombian armed 
conflict should receive full reparation from the State and other armed actors 
who have violated their rights, those who lay down their weapons also require 
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guarantees in civilian life such that they do not decide to return to criminal 
activity. Towards that end, the focus on transitional justice proposed by the 
government of Juan Manuel Santos should strengthen the implementation 
not only of the Victims’ Law but also the reintegration process. Ignoring the 
needs of former combatants based on an exclusionary perception of their role 
in society can only prolong the conflict that continues to be fuelled by PDGs. 
Many demobilised individuals were also initially victims of the armed conflict, 
and joined armed groups due to coercion or a lack of alternatives in contexts 
where their rights went ignored. As such, their inclusion in society should be 
considered to be a function of their participation as citizens and rights holders.
In conclusion, internal forced displacement in Colombia remains one of 
the most pressing manifestations of the humanitarian crisis created by the 
multiplicity of actors in the armed conflict. Their adaptive capacity in relation 
to lucrative illegal businesses and their social and territorial control over 
traditionally excluded and vulnerable populations has generated new forms of 
criminal organisations that threaten the sustainability of any peace initiative 
in the country. Their existence also raises questions as to whether a cessation 
of hostilities will immediately lead to the end of generalised violence and 
forced migration. The path to post-conflict thus leads through a transition 
that guarantees the rights of victims and former combatants in a pragmatic 
and complementary scenario. This is one of the most pressing challenges for 
building peace in Colombian society.
